COLLABORATION TWO:

DAVID   DUNN   and
    KENNETH GABURO

                              discuss:

                                        PUBLISHING
                                              AS
                                            ECO-
                                          SYSTEM

"The creative act consists not only in the stipulation
and formation of concrete structures, but in responsible
maintenance of them. Furthermore, such structures demand
of us the necessity to create and maintain environmental systems
within which they can function properly."

Kenneth Gaburo: *THE BEAUTY OF IRRELEVANT MUSIC*

DD: One word which seems to recur when contemplating LINGUA PRESS is that of family, I mean this not only in the obvious sense of belonging to something, but more precisely in the sense of household. What occurs to me is the similarity between the Latin word *familia* meaning household, to the Greek *oikos* meaning house, root of the word "ecology". Considering that the press is in your home, the image which comes to mind when I see the hundreds of boxes stacked up here, is one of maintenance or perhaps cultivation, as-if each of these printed works were houseplants being tended and cared for. This notion of maintenance also seems linked to household in the sense of a *house of ideas* or to borrow Gregory Bateson's terminology, "an ecology of mind". Could you expand on that idea specifically with regard to publishing as an environmental system?

KG: To begin with, I characterize *family* as an interpersonal, relational, and interactive network. To do so is to recognize it as a system of *influences*. By influence, I refer to a dynamic, ...and preferably, creative..., interplay of push-pulls, give-takes, actions-reactions between and among its members AND their environment.

DD: How does this description translate into publishing, per se?

KG: Rather easily. It not only refers to family in the usual sense, but also to the interactions of human, living organisms in general.

DD: Then regarding Lingua you use the expression metaphorically?

KG: Yes, but also literally. When I began with the question: "What kind of press shall Lingua be?", the answer was: "I desire it to be a kind of family"; an *intentional ecology* if you like. Since its beginning nine years ago, Lingua has been nvolved in constructing and nurturing this reality.

DD: Is it working?

KG: It works if one understands it to be a process; an unfolding; a non-linear system, therefore always open and searching.

DD: How does that work in a practical sense?

KG: Each of its 115 issues to date, in one *non-standardized* fashion or another, offers concrete evidence for Lingua's concept. The published works are the foreground for what you aptly call "a house of ideas". But the rig is being assembled. If it's to be consistent with the fundamental idea of family it cannot ever be completed since it must always be willing to correct itself and start again.

DD: This notion of building something which grows beyond its initial imagining is very much akin to the awe I felt upon viewing the Köln Cathedral. It's fascinating that what has basically been reduced in our time to a tourist attraction, or merely to an historic architectural example, took seven centuries to build and involved multiple generations. But beyond the tourists and history books stands this incredible human-made structure that leaves one with the impression of a natural landscape, of something carved by meta-human effort. For me this not only says that the realm of ideas is a larger environment than that which any individual occupies, but also suggests a kind of organic life which is generated through our collective thinking. A culture is not just something we are born into; it is something we each dream into being. While such dreams are beautiful they are also discomforting. This is certainly true of Lingua.

KG: Sure it is, especially since Lingua's focus on the *maker*, the *making*, as well as the *made* often collides with practicalities.

DD: How so?

KG: Well, for instance, we are all a little impatient. We want things to get done; and the sooner the better. There's so much urgency, and so much to do. Lingua's absence of customary editorial and rigid deadline policies, ...policies which I consider to be serious acts of censorship against the creative act..., sometimes drive people nuts.

DD: We also have become distrustful of publishers.

KG: Yes, so it takes time to demonstrate that a substantial alternative exists. But the most complicated collision occurs at the gut level.

DD: Are you referring to the desired interaction between publisher and author?

KG: Yes; first of all there. As you well know, it seems insufficient to me that an author's responsibility consists solely in the making of a work's *content*. Since I regard a made work...say, a book, a score..., to also be an *environment*, ...a location, a circumstance..., which *contains* its content, then such matters as format, layout, paper, binding, dimension, calligraphy, must necessarily be bound to a work as made, and as published. Now, rarely do authors consider such matters as integral to their work; but when they do, it is generally an editor who has the say, and often a unilateral one. And so, encouraging involvement and participation to the extent Lingua desires is difficult for many authors.

DD: That seems an extraordinary contradiction.

KG: Why?

DD: It's obviously to the author's advantage.

KG: True; but some actually have not considered such things; others consider them extraneous; some view Lingua's more "radical" format departures as a replacement for "content"; others abandoned such values as hopeless, given experiences with one-sided publishing contracts, corporate anonymity, or the current take-over of houses by managers who are anything but creative thinkers.

DD: But Lingua's ideals are implicit in the nature of publishing, which historically have been the basis of important publishing houses, small and large.

KG: Quite so; however many current-day publishers have become distracted, lost their way, or simply give lip-service to what they once believed. But Lingua is part of a growing movement to restore and to further the values we speak of. Certainly there are those, such as yourself, who know they need to participate more fully, and actively.

DD: That reminds me of the feelings I had while working with you on the publication of my book *SKYDRIFT*. There was an extraordinary sense of having maintained intimacy with what I was making through the publishing process. I was able to participate all the way down the line, including talking with the printer, making color selections, viewing negatives, and not having to compromise such things as unusual cover design. I doubt that I could have done any of those things, yet alone all of them, with most other publishers. But, since you have suggested there is currently a kind of dismemberment-separation between a work-as-made, and as-published, how does Lingua hope to mend that?

KG: Well, I have mentioned some ways.

DD: Yes, but many of these occur behind the scene and I wonder whether an issued work as "environment" is actually observed and understood as such, ...since so much of it is very subtle.

KG: Except for the most sensitive, informed readers, I doubt that these levels are observed, although they surely exist in the work's concretion.

DD: Then how does Lingua hope to mend this separation?

KG: First by observing what else needs to be done, then to take steps such as we're now doing; to note, here and there, general developing positions on publishing; to stress the deeper implications of Lingua's so-called categories, e.g. *Scoreplay, Bookplay, Printplay*, ...where 'play' is not game, but *elasticity* (as in ecology); to encourage involvement; to argue for the profound significance of a published work as a 'living' entity; to continue to affirm that the *creative imagination*, wherever it exists,...in the author, publisher, listener, reader, performer..., is probably the only conceptual-actual environment where the mind-body can be *free* in current-day life.

DD: How do you mean that?

KG: Well, for instance, there does exist a kind of insidious competitive pragmatism today. Its participants-practitioners who elevate the temporary titilation, ...the instant hit..., to an 'art form', are anything but free. Moreover, the intensity of this *push*, which attempts to sweep aside anything else of value, has become a new elitism, and is, de facto, censorial. As such, it renders others less free.

DD: And that's where the money is...

KG: ...and, cheap thrills. Why else would anyone give up freedom?

DD: Beyond the presence of this censorial elite are their effects. Foremost is a kind of tragic innocence which results from the rather insidious control of the popular media. Its victims are so intoxicated by advertising and junk culture that an alternative seldom gets a chance to penetrate their blindness. Yet these consumers believe themselves to be free because they have choice between two brands of designer jeans or two brands of politicians. Freedom is not even an issue because of the negative symbiotic relationship existent between consumers and manufacturers. No other imagining is allowed to exist in that world except that which might profit business or contribute further to consumer addiction. In either case questions are seldom asked, whereas freedom demands the responsibility to look further. If I were to press you into formulating a single burning issue which drives you at present, what would it be?

KG: Concerning a made work, particularly an innovative one, I note the existence of substantial denial, disengagement, and outright dismissal on the part of many observers. These are reflected in a variety of social attitudes, including the concept of "object".   Now, things made are *not* objects, but *subjects*, so imbued by human thought. As such, I see them as 'living'. A work cannot make itself.   Makers do that. An observer is *necessary* in order to further its livingness. This chain is implicitly interactive, and interactions are *dependencies*. Living systems are subject-dependent, and not object-independent. Thus to deny, to disengage, to dismiss is not only to do so to some existential work, but also does so to its maker, and to its dismisser. Quite literally, one can dismiss one's own existence!

DD: But Lingua's degree of involvement with what it publishes is substantial.

KG: To be sure. But if it is to avoid becoming elite by a kind of 'in-house' patronage, generated by its own need to exist, it *must* continue to reach out. It is precisely this reaching out which is so challenging. There can be no choice about it.

DD: So you/Lingua aspire to the development of a greater and deeper social consciousness, ...a kind of enlightenment?

KG: Why not? If Lingua can help to further these then, indeed, it might be possible to speak of a "household" or an "ecology of minds".

DD: With reference to your idea that publishing is a collaboration between author and publisher, what immediately comes into focus is the issue of ownership. You have stated that a publisher cannot own an author's work. Do you equate copyright with ownership, or are you referring to something more fundamental?

KG: Copyright is one official means by which people can claim something as their own. In this sense, one may speak of copyright as legitimized ownership. It amounts to a kind of protection, as long as it is understood that what is primarily protected is the actual material, form, and content of the specific document so copyrighted; but not its *idea*. However careful a publisher may be with maintaining a work's integrity it is not necessarily protected from the possible outrageous consequences of its having been issued. Here I have in mind such matters as opinion, bad-mouthing, hear/say, naivete, censorship, plagiarism. Since I think a work's decay, i.e. its corruption, ...at least in terms of its idea..., begins at the moment it is issued, the protection which copyright affords is not of very much value.

DD: In view of what you've just said, to what extent do you feel compelled to participate in laws such as copyright?

KG: My sentiment is in direct conflict with the fact that Lingua is in the world. The extent to which it is regarded as a business suggests the degree to which it has to be involved in the ownership-copyright issue. Even in this limited view, however, I make a distinction: I will not claim ownership for a work unless it's my own. Authors whose work Lingua publishes hold their own copyrights, and, thereby, claim ownership.
DD: I gather you do not see Lingua as a business?

KG: Not in the usual sense of the word.

DD: As what then?

KG: Quite apart from the legal issues we've been discussing, which only make sense in a commercial world, Lingua Press is a cause; an artistic one which, above all, involves the making of something. In this, the notion of ownership is addressed by a far more fundamental issue.

DD: How so?

KG: I think of making as possessing, and being possessed by, something. This 'something' is an idea, ...perhaps demonical..., which demands expression in concrete form. Ultimately, when made, a work has its own life; and, its maker is essentially free of those 'possessions' which generated it. In the process, a kind of purgation has taken place; something of a maker's self has been given up. But, such an experience leaves traces. I call them *privacies*. Privacies do not appear in the made work; nor can they ever be taken up or owned by anyone else. I call this kind of possession: *ownership*. In an ideal collaboration, say between author and publisher, each side experiences such things.

DD: Then you do equate publishing with the creative act?

KG: Absolutely; the ACT! Publishing *is* composition for me.

DD: But as long as the world seems to operate on the need to have public documents which protect people's rights, how does Lingua make this reality compatible with its artistic ideals?

KG: What the world seems to need is not what an experimental press desires, since the latter's essential concern is with what is not yet the case. Because Lingua currently plays footsie with copyright does not suggest it succumbs to its premises.

DD: What *does* Lingua succumb to?

KG: To continue generating laws such as copyright for the sake of protecting people from each other is to create and perpetuate *distrust*, and, moreover, begs a fundamental issue. The issue is that laws provide each of us with the means of looking *elsewhere* for a kind of moral, ethical, behavioral guidance, and the resolution of conflicts. As such, they take each of us off the hook. I think that individuals alone are responsible for their acts. This is what Lingua succumbs to. We have yet to learn how to look deeply within ourselves; to engage each other directly and more substantially; to discover the degree to which we can develop and *depend* on our own mind and body. Now I think we will never learn to care for ourselves, ...for each other..., much less the things we do and make, so long as big daddy (also human and fallible, I remind you) is counted on to do our work for us, presumably for the betterment of society as a whole.

DD: I also think such a charge can be leveled at the idea of "professionalism". We've in large part given up comprehensive responsibility for doing things ourselves in favor of some presumed "better society" looked over by the "better trained". The professionals determine the shape of our lives while we hide our anxieties with specialized roles in an increasingly constrained world. In music there is certainly an authoritarian attitude about making what people supposedly should listen to which neither encourages making music for oneself nor creative listening. Even when something personal is made one can too easily succumb to this attitude through either societal pressure to conform or just plain old economic necessity. I really wonder at what point the making of something private, unique, and beautiful becomes just another consumer product. I'm sure we've both known composers whose work started out as non-conformist, and because of their compulsion to make it as a pro, composition became just another redundant act of profiteering. To question the consensus aesthetics of one's culture is to also question its definition of professional. But to reject the status-quo makes life on the street extemely difficult.

KG: Certainly it does, except that it would be worse without it. But look, suppose someone plays a work of yours, in public, so badly that it doesn't even sound like your work. Would you call that opinion, censorship, plagiarism (as-if something was stolen from you in order to make another work)? Would you sue? Could I say I want to protect a work of mine so much that I will have to inquire how you hear it, and, if you're hearing it improperly, then I don't want you to hear any more of it? What kind of nonsense is that? What *rights* having to do with music, per se, are actually protected here?

DD: None. A person who performs a work of mine is going to perform it well or not, based on what it demands, and based on the integrity of that performer. With or without copyright it can be played superbly or mutilated.

KG: Exactly; and, if there are difficulties?

DD: We would work them out together.

KG: What you've just said also holds for a listener.

DD: Then what *does* Lingua own?

KG: It owns the actual published materials, since it has paid for them.
That's the legal criteria. It seems so trivial because the intrisic issues
reside in the nature of a work itself; how and what it is and does. On this
level, any notion of ownership is totally irrelevant. Issues of
ownership,...generated mostly by IRS mentalities..., although seen as
fundamental, are actually a gloss over what is.

DD: How does what we've been discussing relate to Lingua as a publishing
'house'?

KG: In order to maintain a work's integrity, a publisher has also to be in
a state of integrity. Caring and nurturing have to exist on both sides; not
only by material effort, but by attitude. Lingua acts as-if it actually
made a given work it is to publish. I do not mean as-if it owned it, but
as-if it had the same responsibility for making it as did the author.

DD: When deep thinking is exhibited by musicians in our culture, it seems
to be actively resented. Perhaps this is a sign of the degree to which
music itself is regarded as trivial.

KG: I don't know what culture is in its general usage. It does appear that
"society" (an equally ambiguous expression) assumes a state of "culture" to
exist, and that it is a *thing*. These assumptions are postulated by
individuals, however, ...members within so-called "society". I have never
heard SOCIETY, taken as a whole, claim culture, nor do I think it can
generate it.

DD: But if culture is not actual, what good does it do to hold on to the
notion?

KG: As concept, the idea of culture is a near-absolute imperative if we are
to survive. There are many signs today which point to its worthiness;
manifestations in thought and deed, ...things, if you like..., on the way to
an actual societal culture. But for it to be *the* case, *each* human will have
had to profoundly help in its construction.

DD: Do you think *that* level is attainable?

KG: I doubt it; but then... yes, ...perhaps with considerable imagination
and effort...,

DD: ...and also deep thinking...,

KG: ...to be sure, ...but also a kind of corporate...

DD: ...consciousness.

KG: Yes.

DD: Then is the resentment to which I referred, imaginary?

KG: Not at all. I am reminded of the historic ongoing conflict of
attitudes concerning mind vs. body, intellect vs. intuition, among a variety
of either/or's.

DD: But how can anything be cultivated without optimal use of both mind and body?

KG: How indeed. There it is..., you point to a fundamental conceptual dysfunction. Consider the degree to which music is perceived from a hedonistic, relativistic, pragmatic view, each insisting on its view as *the* only view. Consider the degree to which music is perceived as unable to "talk back", thereby allowing for *any and all* views. But how many seriously interrogate the multiplicity of music's unique voices, for what each is and does? To do that requries calling upon all of the mind and body. So, I don't think it is the resentment of deep-thinking which directly trivializes music, but the presence of *shallow* thinking which trivializes both music and thinking.

DD: I'm often disappointed by musicians and their inability or unwillingness to articulate what they do. They seem so willing to accept the societal view of themselves as being basically shiftless, irresponsible, or just plain stupid. This affirmation allows certain musicians to give full attention toward attaining technical expertise on some mechanical device. But can this form of stagnant addiction be sufficient in the face of all the questions that living in the latter twentieth century confronts them with? So who's at fault?
KG: Well, I don't fault listeners. They don't have any particular way to learn about *music* at the moment except from musicians and thoughtful people who speak out for it in some intelligent manner.   If those who are informed are not aware, or simply ignore, that people need to hear more from them, then it is they who are not thinking.

DD: What other than making-music do you think listeners need to hear from musicians?

KG: Bundles of thoughts about hearing and listening, for instance. These capacities are learned. You know how long it takes to *cultivate* them. And there's no end to it. Each *new* work challenges the ear all over again. In the absence of necessary and needed education, a listener is frequently confronted by a domain for which there is no easy referent in the mind of that listener. And, as long as music's practitioners simply complain, or insist that "music alone says it", or describe its complexities in simplistic, watered-down, spoon-fed, cutesy terms, the dysfunctions we now discuss will not be resolved.

DD: Do you really think the solutions just rest with music-makers per se?

KG: Actually "listeners" are also culpable. Let's not forget that a new music, one which deviates from so-called "norms", enters into an ongoing socio-attitudinal circuit. This 'circuit' frequently exhibits the absence of a genuine curiosity. Learning is work, but not a disease, and not mere body presence. It's easier to be persuaded by what someone else says, or by self-effacements such as "why don't you make it *simple*, so I can understand it". Before *complexity* can ever be understood as a value, something rather extraordinary has to be done to change those attitudes which block the need to inquire.

DD: What are the responsibilities of a music publisher toward changing such attitudes?

KG: They have to be challenged by offering alternatives, and by encouraging people to consider them. Serious music is not going to be much wanted until other work gets done.

DD: Exactly what is not wanted? Is it specific ideas that are rejected, or the mere presence of ideas which is threatening?

KG: From my vantage point what is not wanted is business-as-usual; the status-quo. From some other side what is not wanted is genuine and continuous change.

DD: Why?

KG: Well status-quo offers comfort, stability, security, certainty, ...knowns. Changings, somehow, are seen as opposing these values. I have a certain sentiment for the status-quo position, especially given the persistent convulsions of this century. At the same time, current knowns were yesterday's unknowns. I find it sad that unknowns are so threatening, as-if something will be taken away or lost should one inquire further. But this is so silly. The inventor of the wheel did not take away walking, and Schoenberg did not take away Gesualdo. If they did, who or what let them? Change can enrich; it need not replace or deprive.

DD: Isn't that a rather idealistic position since so many fear change?
KG: How could enlightenment not be an 'ideal' worth pursuing?

DD: One issue you are having to confront repeatedly is whether the Press should go non-profit or remain a business in the usual sense. If going non-profit would make things easier, why have you hesitated?

KG: First, let me preface my answer by saying there's little question in my mind that creative, innovative people are not very much wanted today, and in that sense are second-class citizens.

DD: Do you say this because they frequently find themselves unaccepted?

KG: Yes, and frequently impoverished.

DD: Also unsupported, and, what they do, resisted?

KG: Yes, all of these things, and more. But whatever the cause, negative feelings, ...questions of self worth for instance..., build up very early on. These can be the un-doing of an otherwise healthy, creative person. I'm pretty sure that artists, musicians, humanitarians are not part of the world as are doctors and lawyers.

DD: How does this relate to non-profit though?

KG: Well non-profit status would make life a hell-uv-a-lot easier. But I think to accept it would be an admission that innovative work is unable to make its own way.

DD: I think there's a fallacy in what you've just said in that you have already admitted to music and art not being capble of making their own way. When you call creative people second-class citizens, or claim they're not much a part of the world, why is it an issue whether or not you admit that status if you already believe it? Shouldn't the issue be: what can be done to make art and music a more dynamic part of the world?

KG: You bet! But this can only be considered in the light of what is not being done, ...both regarding attitudes and deeds. Look, the IRS regards what we do as a hobby and a luxury. Through its granting programs our government legitimizes art, and *de facto*, 'defines' what it is. Business corporations validate their *own* economic stance by supporting "culture", (I also notice very few anonymous donors). Capacity audiences become *the* criteria for a work's value. One can easily observe what kinds of programs *in Universities* get dropped when the economic going gets tough. On and on. In the end, these *kinds* of support in the name of "culture" amount to

assuaged guilt, tokenism, and, disillusionment for the artist who has come
to depend on them.

DD: But doesn't the existence of such "support", however flawed *confirm*
your admission that music and art are not capable of making their own way?

KG: What you say is so, only because it is generally believed to be so. My
acceptance of this premise would be an *admission* to an *assumption* held by
many as *the case*. Now I challenge that assumption by postulating another
one, namely: that an artist, ...no matter the specific persuasion..., can
earn an honest wage, *as artist*, without compromise, pandering, or loss of
dignity when a "cultured environment" wants, needs, and highly values what
artists do. In the absence of this very powerful assumption, one is left
with what is currently assumed: that an artist *cannot* earn an honest wage as
such, and thus must resort to patronage of one kind or another, or simply do
something else concurrently. This also is referred to as a "cultured
environment".   But here an artist's dignity is at the *mercy* of whime,
caprice, and *art-as-luxury*.

DD: And, given your assumption, an artist's dignity would be an intrinsic
part of the dignity of people as a whole; that is, *art-as-necessity*.

KG: Quite! To be sure, the weight of history supports the assumption of
patronage. The assumption I make seems impossible, given current-day
evidence, exceptions not-with-standing. And so, one is more or less left
with that's how it is. To say, 'that's not how it should be' begins, as you
have suggested, the process of finding ways to turn things around.

DD: I sense a very clear willingness on your part, and Lingua's, to push
for your preference.

KG: Yes. I don't think it's ever been considered seriously enough, except
by a few. Mostly everyone concerned, complains and succumbs. However, the
task does seem insurmountable.

DD: Obviosuly, one can only go against the grain up to a certain point
before continued survival becomes a problem.

KG: Well, I certainly acknowledge the need for monetary support, but not as
if there's no exit from patronage. I'm not against money. I'm against the
price artists generally pay for it. Survival depends on being *needed*, not
merely economics.

DD: And, as you've said, laws don't change things such as survival-as-need;
that is, beyond the basics we all know about such as hunger. In fact they
may work against human dignity.

KG: I think so. Surely you know many poor people who have dignity because
their environment is enriched in so many other ways; because they have
something quite fulfilling to do with their lives?

DD: That is certainly true if choice is a factor or if we're talking about
vernacular cultures with unique solutions to living in a particular
environment. Defining poverty becomes a superfluous act. In that sense
what government hands down usually constitutes interference.

KG: And fighting that kind of interference is what gives many political
prisoners dignity because of the power of their beliefs.

DD: That stubbornness is also an appropriate response to environment.

KG: After all is said and done, ...perhaps I'm just plain stubborn too.
There's a kind of dignity in that.

DD: In an increasingly monochromatic world, making any kind of unique statement becomes an endangered activity. People who make such statements and descriptions seem relegated to the same extinction status as the rest of the planet's diversity. But I really feel that there is no alternative but to speak out. As cultural, linguistic, and biotic diversity diminishes, it just isn't enough to be involved in documenting what is quickly disappearing. The only alternative we have is to imagine what a more diverse world would be like and build it. As artists we can and do construct such new ideologies.

DD: Our mention of political prisoners reminds me that for as long as I've known you, you have always spoken of politics in pejorative terms. Since one of your intentions as both publisher and teacher seems to include the desire to change societal attitudes, how is that *not* political?

KG: Desires, per se, are not political. Desires are desires. However, the *means* by which a desire is put forth may certainly be political. I'm against politics as they stand, not desires.

DD: How so?

KG: The essential attribute of any political system is that there be an adversary. In this, it is implicit that there be a winner and a loser. So-called "stalemates" are merely holding actions, ...as yet unresolved issues..., along the win-lose continuum. For instance, the expression "peaceful co-existence", has in no sense resulted in 'PEACEFUL' co-existence. In political systems someone is always disposed of as instanced by a loss of position, defeat, power, influence, ability...

DD: Or, something is always supressed as in an issue, or idea.

KG: Right. Now these losings are the consequences of those who also have desires, but who choose political manipulations to implement them.

DD: But you seem to *think* politically.

KG: When it is appropriate, yes.

DD: Can you clarify that?

KG: Let's say I'm to address some politico, and, I'm persuaded that it is necessary to think in political language. I could not engage the ideas expressed without invoking, contextually, that language and system of thought. But I know it is not the only thinking language I possess.

DD: Nevertheless, are you not fighting fire with fire at such a point? Does this not raise a fundamental dilemma in that your adoption of political language reinforces the political system you despise?

KG: No, I would not be, and it does not. When I resort to political language my intention is to enter into a dialogue with some politico, who, say by language or disposition, provides me with no other means of access at this point. I might certainly prefer to discuss my latest composition, but I doubt that would advance a given political issue. So, my desire to engage, as apposed to shrugging my shoulders, would require the use of political language. But my intention would not be to shut the politico up, ...although this is always a very great temptation..., but, rather, to make it clear that no single view of any human condition, via any particular system, is an *only* view.

DD: So, while you may not be concerned that there be a loser, you do acknowledge bias.

KG: Or, *preference*. In what I've said, I suggest that the use of political language, and, thereby, the behaviors of politics, may be seen to have different intentions. One can intend political strategy to shut *someone* down, or open (here I do not mean *carve*) someone up. Since the consequences of these intentions would clearly be different, then so must their *means* be.

DD: Now, of course, one could argue that by putting forth this alternative you are no longer describing a political system as it has been historically conceptualized since you are demanding that while political language may be appropriate in a political context, it is not the only language appropriate to that context.

KG: True, therefore, my 'political' language argues for something else. So be it. But at the same time, it also challenges the win-lose assumptions of that system. To me, this suggests that the "dilemma" you referred to rests with the inflexibility of that system's language and thought, and not with mine. However, should my political language not be political, I would not in the least be bothered. By its use, I'm not interested in demonstrating its infallibility.

DD: All of what you say, notwithstanding, you still sound like you take an adversary position in the usual political sense.

KG: Perhaps I deceive myself, especially since we are currently bombarded by..., indeed (hm)..., *innundated* by political thought and practice. This state of affairs influences our thinking, our behaviors, and above all, our language. It is so easy to hear every utterance as a political one; not unlike what used to be the case with Freudian sexology. The pollution is so dense as to generate a sense that there's no way around it: to desire a change in societal attitudes is to proceed in the light of existent political strategies.

DD: Is this mere fashion then, or does it reflect the emergence of an essential human tendency?

KG: Maybe both; it is certainly au courant that almost everything be explained as political, and resolved politically. It may also reflect an essential human tendency, especially in the light of a "society" which elevates competition to an "art-form". Competitive attitudes support, or perhaps come from, adversative ones. Now while there is no easy way to escape its current dominance, it is also devastating to believe that it is the *one* system of thought and action available on which one can depend; that all others, however tenable, must be sub-sumed, ...should I say consumed?..., by it. Therefore, my desire to work for changing societal attitudes translates into a desire to pose alternatives to the way one thinks about things. To change one's thinking requires a change in one's language, which is what one thinks with. For instance, a society which cultivates the notion of "adversary", could, just as well, come to cultivate the notion of 'difference'.

DD: Aren't you just substituting words?

KG: I don't think so. I've already described what adversaries signify. Differences, however, signify distinctions, which, when made, are inherently appositional, not oppositional; ...not either-ors..., but simply: *this is not that*. By recognizing this kind of non-agreement, so-called society has the best chance of surviving. The task before us, then, is to learn how to connect our differences, not to find more sophisticated ways to eliminate them.

DD: What do you see as an example of a non-politic, and how can society function non-politically?

KG: Let's call such a non-politic: MUSIC! Now, I do not imply that music could not be used for political purposes, that is, by some *associational* hallucination; but rather that music, in its essential nature, quite magnificently, has nothing to do with politics. As to the second part of your question, a place to start is for people to realize that any politic is about as good as yesterday's newspaper, and, that we're doing ourselves in by embracing it as *the* panacea for what ails us.

DD: Many publishers seem content to limit their activities to specific categories, and further, to set boundaries within them. Do you agree?

KG: Yes. For instance under the categories of *music and dance*, Bowker lists such items as "basic techniques", and "study aids"; ditto for language, art, drama.

DD: But are the works within or between such categories linked?

KG: No.

DD: Then works become mere lists; lexical items?

KG: Yes. And, as you've suggested, lists are severely constrained by those who determine what is included in a given category.

DD: How do you feel about that?

KG: Not good, even though lists are a kind of paratactic. But lists, constrained by categories, also have a way of determining on-going standards. If one wants to get published, one better write a "how-to", or another "methods" book.   But try to publish something for which there is no *prescribed* category or listing. Once a category gets established, a rather remarkable ricocheting effect is initiated. One can follow it around such locations as the copyright bureau, the library of congress, retail bookstores, journalistic reviews, and, at cocktail parties. Hmmmm, we're so damned caught-up in categorization as if a category, of itself, is an *entity*.

DD: How does Lingua put forth alternatives to these matters?

KG: It begins with the assertion that individuals are unique, and except for the most basic human characteristics, *cannot* be categorized. As well, when something unique is expressed, as in a work, *it* cannot be categorized, except for the fact that it says what it is. Now, if, for the sake of some kind of social "order", categories are essential, then these must necessarily connote 'openness' and not 'stricture'. And so, Lingua's *'Play'* idea suggests elasticity, not rigidity; its *Collections* consist of *groupings* of individual works which actually 'speak' to each other even though there are no two alike; its individual works, such as *ALLOS*, contain interactions from authors as diverse as a boxer and a neurologist. Most importantly, Lingua publishes works by makers who, in themselves, are non-trivially interactive. Composers who paint, poets who compose, dancers who write. When one views a given work by these individuals it is impossible to merely refer to what is made as "music", "art", "poetry" in the conventional sense; that is without corrupting a work's very nature.

DD: In this response you began with an assertion. Now, how does Lingua avoid using other people's work as a statement of your personal polemic?

KG: It doesn't and I don't. At the same time they are invited to use Lingua as a location for their personal polemic aren't they? I think any maker of consequence takes a position. By position I mean an attitude,

aesthetic, ...an arument, belief, or some notion manifest in a work by what
a maker *is* and *intends*. So, Lingua takes a position by publishing
positions.

DD: Then this is your bias...to publish unique positions?

KG: At the moment I refer to such published positions as experimental.

DD: Why experimental?

KG: Because an experimental work, de facto, is in apposition to some aspect
of history which precedes its existence; it *pushes* existent *boundaries*. It
is precisely this feature which distinguishes an experimental work from,
...let's say..., an imitative or anecdotal one. Surely Lingua is not needed
to further these latter kinds of work.

DD: You do not see bias as prejudice?

KG: Certainly not. One good artistic polemic deserves another. That's
all.

DD: In this then, by apposing history, Lingua takes chances.

KG: Quite correct. Innovation cannot be imagined otherwise.

DD: And taking chances makes you vulnerable?

KG: I accept that,...since humans are anyway.

DD: Of course. And since this is so, why don't more people take chances?

KG: Weight.

DD: In what sense?

KG: Weight, ...the weight of historic accompishment...; this makes it
difficult to imagine what a next step could be.

DD: Even though next steps are always available?

KG: Yes.

DD: Why?
KG: The more civilization 'lives', the more its precedence is escalated.
For those who are unable to get past the weight of historic influence, one
observes redundancy, ...more, not less, conformity..., and, self-deception.
That's the price. But the prize is social acceptance. Others are not so
easily satisfied, no matter how gorgeous 'what is' *is*. For these people,
the consequences of overcoming history's constrictions, ...evidenced by
thought and deed..., frequently appear grotesque, outrageously distorted,
and surely, anti-social. That's the price. But the prize is freedom and
self-enlightenment.

DD: Given these two general "antagonisms" what would connect them, or are
they always to be separate existences?

KG: No, not separate existences, but distinct positions, because in these
two responses to history lies a fundamental *connection* between them: *one* is
connected to history whether by acquiescence, or resistance. To deny the
existence of history and the push-pulls of these "antagonisms", as you call
them, is impossible and utterly pretentious! History is our essential
referent. We're always looking backwards. We are the inheritor's of all
history's *stuff*. However, it is possible to acknowledge it, and yet, not
accept it; to admire certain aspects and to despise others; to question its
premises and fundamental assumptions. In order to do what?

DD: Certainly not to deify it.

KG: Nor to kick it in the ass.

DD: If neither, then what?

KG: Well, for one thing, to let it remind us of what still needs to be done; to take note of those things which are yet *absent* in it. For another, to not allow it to exert *undue* influence. That's where attitude and the subversion of self, by way of discipline, come in. And so, one has to be tough with it; tough with one's own work (a history); one's self (also a history), ...because *no* history is merely "out there".

DD: I agree. Each of us observes something of it while being part of it, but never outside *of* it. Since we observe it with our own faculties, it becomes part of us, ...it resides *in* us. this is an undeniable kind of interaction.

KG: And we could not know that we have observed it unless we describe it to ourselves.

DD: For this we need language. We describe it with whatever language resides in each of us.

KG: I think so. I would also like to say I think history *is* language, ...*all* of it..., as described by *thought and deed*; described by human observers in one manner or another. Now, I imagine this pushes the whole concept of history-language to the extreme. But I want to push this thought even further by saying that *description*, ...always exhibited in some kind of language, and always expressed by some*one*..., is, in itself, *a reality*.

DD: I agree, that's pushing it pretty far!

KG: Today I read a report, ...(a history)..., of a panel discussion entitled *The Critic: Hero or Villain?*, and subtitled: *The Role of the Critic as an Organizer of Culture*. The panel consisted of a moderator, two musicians, and a well-known New York Music Critic. Now, first off, I knew that I was not any of them, and, quite literally, could not perceive anything they perceived as regards the subject at hand, except by *what was said*; any reading of the report became an interrogation of their descriptions. This reality, ...this bit of history..., was *all* I had to go on if I was to enter into discourse (conceptual in this case) with them. That is, I take it that those words were not merely words; they *did* something; they said, ...given the limitations of the report..., what, and how the panelists *thought* about the subject posed.

DD: That's a very analytical position, isn't it?

KG: ...of necessity.

DD: Why "necessity"?

KG: Well, if I'm correct in thinking that descriptive languages are the individually, and thereby, uniquely constructed realities of observed phenomena, ...and, essentially, are what one has to go on..., then language is not merely some convenient "tool". It has to be regarded in the most serious manner. *It* needs to be continually looked at for what it is and does.

DD: Well you've aroused my curiosity. What was said in the report?

KG: There was *no news*. Each panelist spoke as-if the particular topic had *not* been postulated. Comments such as "I read contracts, not reviews" were

in abundance. But suppose the topical language had been taken seriously, such that there could have been consistency between it and what was said? Imagine what could have been done with "Hero", "Villain", "The *Role* of the *Critic* as an *Organizer* of *Culture*"? Good God, what a collection of assumptions! But not one challenge! Instead, the topical language was left conspicuous by its absence; dismissed in favor of an "image" *held* in the mind of each panelist; an image which I suspect was formulated outside of the environment of that panel. It was the collective "image" I read about; *no news*.

DD: I take it that by language you refer not only to verbal language?

KG: That's correct. In my example, the 'dismissed topic' became an 'unobserved' language, and the photographs included, offered 'gestural' language. But in general, I regard all forms of human utterance (*walking* for instance), including mere presence, as descriptive language, of which the verbal is only *one*. Current linguistic rules, generally inferred from verbal language, are mostly what they are because of a constructed collusion between verbal language and "meaning". But, quite frankly, I don't have the foggiest notion of what language means.

DD: Then is language, in some larger sense, what you're attempting to illustrate through emphasis upon interactions between works which you publish?

KG: Yes. Language is at the base for whatever Lingua does. When I speak of interactive works, I speak of interactive language(s), ...music-as-language, language-as-music for instance. But, I don't invoke these expressions, merely, in some impressionistic sense. In my search I continue to discover more formal and fundamental connections between and among so-called "disciplines", which, on the surface, appear to have little to do with each other. In one manner or another, these observations eventually get published.

DD: Where do you stop?

KG: I don't. I am caught up in language, ...in a search by which I may describe its 'wholeness'. If I can get there, then I would say it is *language* in all of its multi-dimensionality which would enable us to be so bound. As things stand now, "language" seems mostly to be what separates us.

DD: What I see as an implication in what you're saying is that even though there isn't a strong case to be made for *acquired* characteristics in genetics, perhaps there can be in language. That language could be a large coding system in which adaptations are stored, and through which we acquire new characteristics in terms of our physiology. If so, then language takes on a much more ominous presence in that its acquisition may directly affect the body in dramatic ways.

KG: ...especially since language, as you suggest, *is* acquired. Of course it is easy to forget this since we fundamentally acquire it very early on; and, if and when we recognize that we have something called language, it seems so "natural"; as-if it was always there. Now, if learned, then where, when, and from whom or what? No matter. It can easily be inferred that whatever of language is learned, ...as transmitted and received..., contains within it bits and granules of specific history; etymologies, timbres, mannerisms, thinkings; whatever may be said to be contained in the signal, and *influenced* by the very environment in which the signal is transmitted.

DD: I think *that* touches upon what may be some sort of third phenomenon which neither genetics nor linguistics has addressed. It may be the link between these two disciplines which have primarily existed as parallel descriptions. I've come to regard human language as an evolutionary

adaptation through which individuation within the species extends its
influence. This kind of direct imprinting may speed up the evolutionary
process. In light of recent neuro-physiological thought about possible
insufficient neural wiring between the human neo-cortex and the more
primitive brain centers, transformations in language may be evolution's way
of bridging the gap which was previously engineered. Language may, in some
way, be the most physical thing we do.

KG: Bravo!

DD: Since we now speak of this physicality in terms of the whole mind/body
then it is this wholeness which generates language as an expression of the
organism's needs. These needs first become evident as intuitive tremors
within the body and then gradually surface into more complex manifestations.
In an interactive state, the organizing of these complex expressions of need
eventually become synonymous with a larger physical reality when the need is
satisfied. As you have stated, changing one's thinking requires changes in
one's language. This is also true for changing what are generally referred
to as *realities*. I would further state that such changes are a consequence
of , and an instigator for, physiological changes in the brain itself. In
that sense, the generation of new language, as evidence by what experimental
composers make, may in some way alter the deep structures of consciousness.
I would say that the closest you have come to stating an editorial policy
is, more specifically, a demand that a work you consider for publication
demonstrate an expression of such a profound need.

KG: Yes, and thereby, a need of its maker. Moreover, this view is strongly
impulsed by a need to manifest my own existence. Now I know this appears to
be a hard line, so let me say that I equate need with survival. Since I do,
it becomes necessary to ask: On precisely *what* does a given human's
survival depend? Elsewhere I have referred to survival as being needed.
Here I should like to say something about needing. Can needing signify only
basics such as the necessity for oxygen, food, and fucking? Can it simply
be reduced to physical life-death criteria, or *mere* presence? Surely not;
but, if so, then where else, for instance, would one place the human impulse
to express, reach out; to be part of something and not be left out; to
count; to satisfy some deeply-felt urgency to interact with another; to
expand consciousness as you have so beautifully expressed it. Where else,
except in survival's domain? I refer to such needs as *neuro-biological*
necessities. As such, they are properties of all humans, in diverse ways.

DD: How would you differentiate needs from wants?

KG: Wants have to do with choice; needs don't. I cannot arbitrate with
oxygen; nor with the music I write.

DD: Then you believe the artistic impulse to express is not a "special"
attribute?

KG: The *impulse holds* for all people; but in many it gets suppressed,
probably early one. Let's say because the form the expression takes doesn't
"fit" into the existent moulds; it's OK to have dreams, but not to act on
them. Needs have to do with the lack or absence of something. Something
absent can become present (as in composition) by an intentional act.
Conversely, something present can become absent (as in suppression) also by
some intentional act.

DD: How does one know whether the impulse you speak of is a want or a need?

KG: Well, one way would be for each person to interrogate 'self'; that is,
could "I" survive *without* this or that? If "no" comes up then need is
present. Now need, once identified as such, is subject to continual
verification in the light of on-going experience. In my *own* self-
assessment, if, recursively, I can throw away something I considered a need,

then either I really didn't need it, or I no longer do. To me that signifies it never was a need after all, but a want.

DD: Then there can often be a confusion between the two.

KG: Yes, but at the same time I think they are connected.

DD: How?

KG: For instance, I began my life with an intuition about being a composer. Given the processes of interrogation I have outlined, I have long since known that I need to be a composer, and assert: "I am one". About this there is no question. In terms of conscious acts, need precedes want. That is, the assertion that I am a composer does not address "What *kind* shall I be?" As you know, I have been, and hope to continue to be, many kinds. So my need is the constant, and my wants, say in terms of compositional forms, are the variables...in that order.

DD: However, as you say, if the need to express is not a special artistic attribute, then what is there about artists that won't give in to suppression?

KG: Some additional "fuel" is needed. Between us, I would call mine, passion; but that sounds so romantic. So, I'll call it *compulsion* instead.

DD: This doesn't sound very rational.

KG: Yes and no. I think a work made *is* rational, but the processes which go into its making, by its maker, may be anything but.

DD: However, notions of irrationality, both as applied to works and to people, have been considered in perjorative terms for a very long time.

KG: Nevertheless, I hold the creative-imagination, and its impulse to inquire, ...to make..., is irrational.   Say for a scientist who needs to discover what's going on in the Universe, ...when we're up to our asses in trouble here..., seems crazy. But it's also abundantly gorgeous. Such needs are not motivated by any of the usual impulses for why people do things. Needs, of the kind I refer to, may be irrational elements in us; but they are *necessary*!

DD: Then do you consider it a publisher's responsibility to provide background for a particular work's motivation in the sense that each work is not only a set of signs, but is itself a sign, or one possible description of something larger?

KG: I take what you ask to at least be the responsibility of Lingua. But it is not a work which wells-up and says "this needs to be done!" Here lies one aspect of the larger "sign" you refer to; a work is a *sign of life*, not reducible to paper, ink, materials, objects. A work evidences the livingness of its maker. A publisher can intesify this evidence. Now of course, this is so for all made things. But, ...but..., when a work takes chances, that says some maker has! I have a hunch that if the need to push boundaries is reflected in the work, then the compulsion which motivates the work is also evidenced there; that is to say, such works strike me as having a 'cutting edge' which others do not. If I observe a work and am moved to tears, then I know I've found it.

DD: Do you cry much?

KG: Not often. Much of what Lingua publishes is extraordinarily well-made, though. I wouldn't repudiate any of it, though I don't necessarily like it all.

DD: Why does Lingua publish things it doesn't like?

KG: For the hell-uv-it,...and because these, too, put forth alternatives.

DD: That to me is probably the most essential aspect of the press because
it is the only available forum for a certain level of interdisiciplinary
thinking which addresses music at all. Certainly the music journals don't
ever really take on the idea of music as a viable and dynamic part of the
world other than to talk shop. But included in the LINGUA PRESS issuances
have been writings and work from a variety of disciplines. In this respect
there also seems to be a tendency to focus upon work which blurs the more
traditional boundaries of specific fields of inquiry. This is particularly
true amongst the arts where it's gotten progressively more difficult to make
assumptions about whether someone's work resides in the realm of music,
visual arts, poetry, sculpture, or dance. There even appears to be a
growing number of interdisciplinary thinkers, whose work addresses a
multiplicity of fields such as music, philosophy, linguistics, and
literature. Your own work could be described in this fashion. Do you see
these tendencies as merely a sign of the inadequacy of specific disciplines
to express what certain individuals need to express?

KG: A given discipline becomes what it is by those who persistently
interrogate its premises, and, thereby, stimulate its evolution. When seen
in the light of a continuum, a discipline may be said to unfold aspects of
its essential nature.

DD: Can you clarify that?

KG: For instance, Philosophy, when viewed from *within* its 'boundary', is
persistently under interrogation by its members who 'correct', 'clarify',
'shift', 'advance', its premises. In such fashion, Philosophy's evolution
and existence continues to be validated. In this sense it cannot be
referred to as "inadequate".

DD: But, as a discipline it doesn't seem to have helped society very much
except to the limited degree that it has trickled into the mainstream world.

KG: I agree.   That's because it generally sees itself *as a discipline*. But
what do you think Philosophy doesn't see?

DD: I don't think it sees itself clearly enough as a *societal* phenomenon.

KG: Exactly. I don't think so either. And so, when viewed from *outside*
its 'boundary', Philosophy has failed to enrich and directly influence our
general "culture" by not enabling it to think more philosophically and
conceptually. In this crucial sense its adequacy may be questioned.

DD: And yet, it persists; it *continues* to be held together by its own
assumptions.

KG: Of course. And because of this it appears to me to be *stuck* within its
own boundary. Now I hasten to suggest that it is not Philosophy which is
bounded, but the collective thought and thinking maintained by its
practitioners which is, and which, thereby, 'binds' Philosophy. Given a
whole view of things, Philosophy is at once *necessary*, and *insufficient*.

DD: What other factors influence this insufficiency?

KG: Those very attributes which enable a discipline to be a coherent system
also disenable it. One correctly observes: Philosophy is *not* music; Poetry
is *not* Anthropology; Artificial Intelligence is *not* Intelligence. At the
same time, however, such distinctions suggest that our "culture" consists of
special interest groups, ...all somehow proceeding along their own course in
parallel fashion. That these parallels are generally aware of each other is

of little consequence, since, otherwise, they have very little to do with
each other.

DD: Is this what you refer to when you say a discipline can get stuck?

KG: Precisely. But I hold no discipline is so constrained such that it
exists as an independent entity.

DD: Then boundaries and categories are to some extent fairly arbitrary.

KG: Precisely. But I hold no discipline is so constrained such that it
exists as an independent entity.

DD: Then boundaries and categories are to some extent fairly arbitrary.

KG: Yes. At *best*, each discipline constitutes a *range* of concerns, but
certainly not mutually-exclusive limits.

DD: Can a discipline get unstuck?

KG: I think so.

DD: How?

KG: First, its members would have to recognize that they *are* stuck; that
their disicpline is insufficient in the light of a much-needed societal
involvement. Second, its members would have to recognize *their* need to reach
out, even-if only as a matter of survival. Third, its members would have to
attentuate their possessive, authoritarian attitudes with respect to their
discipline. Fourth, its members would have to find *creative* ways to connect
with others. These would be some of the ways in which parallel systems
would become subverted in favor of interactive ones.

DD: But there are efforts in this interdisciplinary direction.

KG: Yes, there have been occasions where it has worked superbly, ...the
Biological Computer Laboratory at the University of Illinois for instance.
But it has also failed miserably where it was only thought to be a good
idea; where 'degrees of relatedness', and not 'degrees of interactiveness'
were its main concerns; where participants were not, within *themselves*
interactive.

DD: Nevertheless, there does appear to be a more general impulse within the
culture to push traditional boundaries.

KG: I think that impulse comes mostly from people who are not the
"experts". Slowly, but surely, I observe a growing recognition that
boundaries, limit-lines, methods, categories, classifications, measurements,
models, statistics, standardizations, rigid formats, ...all such..., *applied*
to almost every aspect of human endeavor, are simply not sufficient
"criteria" to account for the needs of human expression and connection, and
the demand which these make. Such needs cannot be satisfied by societal
'management'.

DD: Do you see specific signs for this emerging tendency?

KG: Yes. Consider those who have begun to realize how complex a seemingly
"simple" act such as interacting, ...and not merely "communicating"..., with
another is. Consider those who have begun to demand a voice in acts,
generated by others, which affect their lives, such as the enormity of the
anti-nuke push. Now, however solipsistic such aberrant tendencies may
appear to be to those who "know better", the attention given to alternative
thinkings is a sign, ...a motion..., away from social indifference toward
enlightenment.

DD: By those who observe their necessary *presence* in such "motion";

KG: ...yes..., and, as distinct from "objective" *apartness*.

DD: Which is to describe the complexity of the mind-body with much more diversity of language than is available through current reductionist ideas about the structure of consciousness. Most psychologist have failed to consider the extraordinary complexity of the mind as a systemic phenomenon. Things have not advanced all that far from Freud, for example, who threw everything that wasn't explicitly in the realm of purposeful consciousness into a big bag called "unconscious". Attempts to improve upon this kind of terminology have mostly focused on mechanistic analysis of the brain's components.

KG: And, while there may be some current value in "localizing" brain-functions, and applying these to specific acts, ...e.g., the right hemisphere "specializes" in visuo-spatial functions..., there is nothing about an act, itself, which can be so singularly "specialized". The simplest compositional act of writing *two notes* in sequence calls forth such a complex set of operations that they, in the light of music, could not possibly dignify the right hemisphere alone.

DD: Can you say more about complexity in terms of your work, specifically?

KG: First, no single mode of expression satisfies all that a particular idea requires, ...I cannot express visually what I can acoustically. But suppose an idea requries both? Since I find it untenable that each could simply pursue a parallel course within a specific compositional space, my task would be to "blur" their 'distinctiveness', ...their 'separateness'..., in favor of a more complex 'distinction' which *includes both*.

DD: Is this the kind of property you refer to as multi-dimensional?

KG: Yes. I see my work, at least since 1962, as that. The kinds of things I draw from the world in order to express an idea, which itself is multi-dimensional, have enabled me to deeply probe the nature of 'language'; for instance, the 'score' as an *environment* in which all of its attributes interact and interconnect, subsuming the details of tone, text, articulation, density, impulses, energies, motion, sensuosity. A work is 'loaded' by the presence of its members, by a highly-charged polyphony. I call them 'voices'. Now, what interests me most about this is *no single* view of a work, ...say, of *SUBITO*..., can be an *only* view.

DD: How do you mean that?

KG: Specifically, one shouldn't be confused by the singleness of *SUBITO*, as entity, with the complex language contained therein. It is not *SUBITO* as one work equals *SUBITO* as one thought. Since a given dimension is *compositionally* connected to all others, it becomes possible for one to enter *SUBITO's* circuit anywhere; access is random. One could enter via its text, title, theater, acoustic, physical gesture, source (i.e., Dante's Canto XVII-Inferno), and so on. The task would be to *assemble SUBITO's* reality by considering the link between this and that dimension for all such. Should that eventuality occur, the interactions of the maker with the made can become those of another observer. By this kind of inquiry one not only participates more fully, but helps to maintain *SUBITO's* integrity as well. What could result are collections of thoughts and descriptions on all sides which address *SUBITO* as *subject*. Now, I refer to matters such as these as mutual participation in an eco-system.

DD: And Lingua Press as-composition proceeds in like fashion?

KG: Yes. I can't imagine how else to do it.